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ABSTRACT
Techniques are provided herein for a time-based anti-replay check. These
techniques may address the 64-bit sequence number recovery issue and the replay check
issue in multi-sender security engine and multi-receiver security engine applications.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Time-based anti-replay checking is mainly used to solve the Security Association
(SA) sharing problem in a system with multiple security engines. Examples systems may
include the same device with security engines in multiple slices, or a modular chassis with
security engines in different line cards. Time-based anti-replay checking can also apply to
different network devices attempting to address the SA sharing problem.
Existing security processing techniques (e.g., Media Access Control Security
(MACSec) – based protocols, Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) – based protocols, other
variations developed based on those protocols, etc.) run into the SA sharing problem, when
multiple engines communicate with one (or multiple) engines on the other end. There are
two parts to this issue: Extended Packet Numbering (XPN) mode high 32-bit word recovery
and anti-replay checking.
Typically, in the transmit direction, each security engine maintains a Packet
Number (PN) per-security flow or SA. The security engine automatically increments the
PN for each packet undergoing security processing. The low 32-bits of the PN is carried in
a security header for decryption and replay checking on the receiving side. If the same SA
is shared among multiple security engines, then that SA is programmed in all security
engines. Therefore, the PNs from different encryption engines may become
unsynchronized, unless the traffic belonging to the SA is distributed relatively evenly
across all security engines, which is unrealistic because SA flow classification tends to be
performed inside the security engine itself. As a result, when these packets reach the same
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security decryption engine, strict replay checking cannot be performed. Theoretically, the
PNs from different encryption engines may be offset by a number so large that even the
high 32 bits (XPN mode) recovery algorithm may fail. In this case, XPN mode cannot be
used and anti-replay check cannot be done.
Additionally, in the receiving direction, each security engine maintains the largest
PN (having a good associated Integrity Check Value (ICV)) seen thus far. The largest PN
plus one is the next PN expected by the receiving engine. Anti-replay checking is
performed against a replay window which is determined based on the biggest PN and the
biggest PN minus a configurable replay window size. When multiple decryption engines
serve the same security flow, similar issues exist. For example, the packet flow may be
unevenly distributed such that one engine does not see any packets belonging to the flow
and the local next PN value is significantly offset from PNs associated with other
decryption engines. In this case, XPN mode cannot be used and anti-replay check cannot
be done.
Figure 1 below illustrates a typical security engine micro-architecture diagram. The
encryption flow is shown from left-to-right and the decryption flow is shown from rightto-left.

Figure 1
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Figure 2 below illustrates an example packet format change after MACSec
processing.

Figure 2

For the encryption flow, a clear text packet first passes through the packet parser,
form a key for SA session lookup, and from lookup result derive a SA number. With the
SA number, all the configuration for this SA (e.g., cryptographic algorithm, cryptographic
key, PN or sequence identifier (ID)) may be derived. Typically, the PN (or sequence ID)
is incremented by one for each packet. The low 32-bits of the PN is carried in the security
header, which is inserted in the packet. The original packet payload part is encrypted, an
ICV is calculated and inserted after the payload, and finally a new Cyclic Redundancy
Check (CRC) value is calculated.
For the decryption flow, similar parsing and lookup processing is performed to
identify the SA, which is used to derive all the associated configurations regarding how to
decrypt the packet. The decryption engine maintains the maximum PN that it has received
for the SA thus far. The maximum PN is used to perform a replay check. The packet is
decrypted and a locally calculated ICV is compared with the ICV bytes carried in the packet.
If the ICV matches, the packet is assumed to be unmodified; if it does not match, the ICV
check is determined to have failed and the packet can potentially be dropped.
The replay check may be performed as shown in the following pseudo code.
If (new packet PN > saved maximum PN) {
Replay check passed, and new packet PN is saved as the maximum PN.
} else if (new packet PN > maximum PN – replay window size) {
Replay check passed, but packet is delayed, keep the original maximum PN
value. Update for packet delay count.
} else {
Replay check failed, packet is dropped.
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}
The PN (or sequence ID) can be 32 bits (non-XPN mode) or 64 bits (XPN mode).
In XPN mode, the entire 64-bit PN is used as the ICV for cryptographic applications, but
only the low 32-bit PN is carried in the security header. On the decryption end, the high
32-bit PN may be recovered based on the locally saved maximum PN and the current
packet PN. Then, the decryption cryptographic function may be applied. This works well
when a single security transmission engine communicates with a single security receiving
engine, as in traditional point-to-point MACSec deployment. However, it breaks down
when multiple transmission engines communicate with multiple receiving engines.
Figure 3 below is a deployment example of MACSec over an overlay Wide Area
Network (WAN) for Data Center (DC) interconnection.

Figure 3

As shown, DC site A use m security engines to encrypt traffic toward the WAN
network. The security engine is usually located inside a physical device or integrated inside
network processor unit port logic. A single security engine can handle 400Gbps (800G or
more) of bandwidth. DC site A distributes its WAN traffic across m security engines using
a load-balancing mechanism. Unless traffic belonging to the same SA is ideally loadbalanced, the PN value will differ among different security engines. This difference may
accumulate with time, and when it becomes significant compared to the receiving security
engine replay check window size, replay check can no longer be performed.
As illustrated in Figure 4 below, in some extreme cases, the PN from engine 1 has
value n, and the PN from engine m has value n + 231. When these two packets reach security
engine 2 on DC site B, security engine 2 is not able to correctly recover the Most Significant
Bit (MSB). This is because the PN is 32 bits, and security engine 2 cannot determine
whether the second packet is 231 numbers before or after the previous packet because the
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gap is too big. Without correctly recovering the high 32-bits of the PN, the entire decryption
process cannot be performed.

Figure 4

The decryption engine may also have similar issues relating to traffic distribution.
For example, if one of the engines does not obtain the same SA packet flow for some time,
its locally maintained maximum PN value lags more than other engines. A packet that fails
the replay check on other engines may pass the replay check with the lagged local
maximum PN value. And in some extreme case, if the local maximum PN lags enough, the
high 32-bit recovery logic will fail.
Accordingly, techniques are provided herein to address the issues discussed above.
These techniques mainly address the 64-bit sequence number recovery issue and the replay
check issue in the multi-sender and multi-receiver cases.
As described herein, in the transmit direction, a binary timestamp (64 bits) may be
used to replace the PN during encryption processing, and the low 32-bits of the timestamp
may be passed in the security header and sent to the receiver. When a packet requests the
PN, the current Precision Time Protocol (PTP) timestamp value may be provided. On the
decryption side, a 32-bit timestamp in the security header and a locally running PTP
timestamp may be used for the high 32-bit recovery logic. After recovery, the entire 64 bits
(e.g., the recovered MSB 32-bit sequence combined with Least Significant Bit (LSB) 32bit sequence from the security header) may be used for decryption processing.
As illustrated in Figure 5 below, a binary timestamp derived from the PTP time
may be used to perform a time-based anti-replay check. A locally running timestamp may
be adjusted to synchronize with other times. All the timestamps on one side (transmission
or reception) may be closely synchronized. In addition, between the transmission security
engine and the receiving security engine, the timestamp may be loosely synchronized. For
example, in case of a single device with multiple slices, a 0 ns timestamp synchronization
error may be achieved between each security engine. And in modular chassis case, with
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the same clock feed to all the line cards, a couple ns timestamp synchronization error may
be achieved. In case of different network devices (typically with a highly-controlled
network topology and within the same location), with class C performance or better PTP
timestamp running, a synchronization error of just a few ns (e.g., approximately 10 ns) may
be achieved. To correctly recover the high 32-bits of the timestamp at the receiving engine
in XPN mode, the timestamp difference between the transmission engine and the receiving
engine may be within 1 second, which is easy to meet even without PTP running between
the transmission engine and the receiving engine.

Figure 5

The replay check window size may be decided by at least two factors. The first
factor is the transmit-side timestamp synchronization error (e.g., 0 or a few ns). The second
factor is the maximum path delay difference across all possible paths between the
transmission engine and the receiving engine. Based on these two factors, a strict timebased replay check may be achieved.
The timestamp may be 64 bits with a one ns unit value. The timestamp may
represent a large number (e.g., over 584 years). In some implementations, the transmission
engine may choose fewer bits and hard code the MSB portion to zero. The receiving engine
may be transparent in this regard. Furthermore, the timestamp may be provided in units of
0.25 ns. The transmit and receiving sides should agree on the same unit for the timestamp.
These techniques may apply to MACSec, IPSec, or any security protocol using PN
(or sequence ID) as the ICV and anti-replay check. For the IPSec use case, the bitmapbased replay check may be disabled (e.g., only time-based replay checking may be enabled).

6
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/5429

6810
7

Wu: TIME-BASED ANTI-REPLAY CHECK

Time-based anti-replay checking may be standardized. One drawback of the time
based PN is that the same timestamp value may be used as the PN (and therefore the same
Initialization Vector for cryptography applications) to multiple packets (e.g., from different
engines) with the same security key.
Time based anti-replay checking may apply to both XPN mode and non-XPN mode.
If the cryptographic process is run in non-XPN mode, the timestamp need not necessarily
be synchronized between the transmit side and the receiving side. In one specific example,
time-based anti-replay check may be applied in XPN mode with SA sharing enabled.
Table 1 below provides a comparison between time-based PN values verses a
traditional PN scheme.
Time-based PN
Point-to-point application

Cons: Potentially, the same

(or no SA sharing) with

timestamp (and therefore

XPN or non-XPN mode

the same IV) is used for

Traditional Packet Number
No cons.

two packets with the same
key.
Multi-point-to-multi-point

Pros: Replay check may be

Cons: Must disable replay

application with SA

performed.

check.

sharing and non-XPN

Cons: Potentially, the same

mode

timestamp (and therefore
the same IV) is used for
two packets with the same
key.

Multi-point-to-multi-point

Pros: Replay check may be

Cons: Must disable replay

application with SA

performed.

check.

sharing and XPN mode

Pros: No issues recovering

Cons: In some extreme

the high 32 bits of the

cases, recovery of the high

timestamp when the

32-bit PN may fail, and as

transmission-side and

a result decryption may

receiving-side timestamps

fail, too.

are loosely synchronized.
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Cons: Potentially, the same
timestamp (and therefore
the same IV) is used for
two packets with the same
key.
Table 1

In summary, techniques are provided herein for a time-based anti-replay check.
These techniques may address the 64-bit sequence number recovery issue and the replay
check issue in multi-sender security engine and multi-receiver security engine applications.
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